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State v. Hinnant: Limiting the Medical Treatment Hearsay
Exception in Child Sexual Abuse Cases
Child sexual abuse remains an alarming social problem in the
United States.' Legislatures and courts have attempted to protect
child sexual abuse victims by developing modified evidentiary
procedures to facilitate the prosecution of alleged perpetrators. z
Nonetheless, reported accounts of child sexual abuse remain high. In
1998, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services estimated
that 903,000 children were reported as victims of maltreatment?
Nearly twelve percent, or 103,845, of these children were sexually
abused.4 These numbers are small, however, when compared to the
number of unreported incidents of child sexual abuse.5
1. JOHN E.B. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT PRACTICE 8
(Jon R. Conte ed., 2d ed. 1998) [hereinafter MYERS, LEGAL IssUEs](stating that research
estimates 500,000 new cases of child sexual abuse occur each year); NAT'L CTR. ON CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT, THIRD NATIONAL INCIDENCE STUDY OF CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT (NIS-3) 3-4 (1996) (noting that the number of substantiated reports of sexual
abuse resulting in harm to children more than doubled between 1986 and 1993).
2. Josephine Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural Trends in State Legislation and
Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 89 DICK. L. REv. 645, 645-46
(1985) (providing examples of state statutes, including special hearsay exceptions, the
elimination of competency qualifications, and the admittance of videotaped testimony by
child sexual abuse victims); see also Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 857 (1990) (holding
that one-way closed circuit television testimony does not violate the Confrontation Clause
if the abuser's presence impairs the child's testimony due to the child's trauma).
3. Nat'l Clearinghouse on Child Abuse & Neglect Information, Child Abuse and
Neglect National Statistics, at http:lwww.calib.comlnccanchlpubslfactsheets/canstats.htm
(Apr. 2000) [hereinafter Abuse and Neglect Statistics] (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Although definitions of abuse vary greatly, maltreatment is generally divided
into two classifications: child abuse and child neglect. Child abuse includes physical,
sexual, emotional or psychological abuse, and child exploitation. Child neglect includes
physical and emotional or psychological neglect. INGER J. SAGATUN & LEONARD P.
EDWARDS, CHILD ABUSE AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 16-17 (Dorothy J. Anderson ed.,
1995).
4. Abuse and Neglect Statistics, supra note 3.
5. Ctr. Against Sexual Abuse, Sexual Assault Statistics, at
http://www.syspac.com/-casa/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2001) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review) (stating that ninety to ninety-five percent of child sexual abuse
cases go unreported to the police); see also MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 8
(stating that the secretive nature of child sexual abuse masks its prevalence); Jessie
Anderson et al., Prevalence of Childhood Sexual Abuse Experiences in a Community
Sample of Women, 32 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 911, 915
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The fact that children are usually the only witnesses to their
sexual abuse exacerbates the difficulty in protecting them from sexual
abuse.6 When the child is unable to testify, members of the child's
family, physicians, and psychologists are often the only witnesses
available to testify to the child's statements.7 The child's out-of-court
(1993) (reporting that sixty-four percent of women responding to a survey who were
sexually abused as children did not disclose the abuse for at least one year and that
twenty-eight percent had never disclosed the abuse prior to taking the survey); David
Finkelhor, Current Information on the Scope and Nature of Child Sexual Abuse, FUTURE
OF CHILDREN, Summer/Fall 1994, at 31, 37, available at
http://www.futureofchildren.orglsac/sac__O2/PDF (last visited Mar. 3,2001) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review) (stating that studies of the prevalence of child sexual abuse
"have led most reviewers to conclude that at least one in five adult women in North
America experienced sexual abuse during childhood").
6. See 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 5.1
(3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2000) [hereinafter MYERS, EVIDENCE].
7. See 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 277 (4th ed. 1992) (providing that in addition
to members of the child's family, hospital attendants and ambulance drivers may qualify as
auditors of the statement under medical treatment or diagnosis exception); 2 MYERS,
EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.1 (stating that out-of-court statements are often the only
method of communicating the allegations of child sexual abuse to the jury). Children are
unable to testify themselves when they lack the requisite cognitive ability, are incapable of
composing themselves, or would not serve as effective witnesses. 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE,
supra note 6, § 7.1.
Most states have statutes or rules admitting children's hearsay statements through
the testimony of mental health professionals under the medical treatment or diagnosis
hearsay exception. ALA. CODE § 12-15-65 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (admissible in juvenile
proceedings under certain circumstances); ALA. CODE § 15-25-31 (1995) (admissible in
criminal proceedings under certain circumstances); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-238 (West
1995 & Supp. 2000) (admissible in adoption, dependency, and termination proceedings
under certain circumstances); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West 1995) (admissible in
juvenile proceedings under certain circumstances); id § 1350 (admissible in criminal
proceedings under certain circumstances); COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25-129 (2000)
(admissible in criminal, delinquency, and civil cases under certain circumstances); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3513 (1995 & Supp. 2000) (admissible in any judicial proceeding
under certain circumstances); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803(23) (West 1999) (admissible in
any civil or criminal proceeding under certain circumstances); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-3-16
(1995 & Supp. 2000) (admissible under certain circumstances); IDAHO CODE § 19-3024
(Michie 1997) (admissible in child protection and criminal proceedings under certain
circumstances); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (Michie 1998) (admissible in criminal cases
under certain circumstances); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-460(dd) (1994 & Supp. 1999)
(admissible in criminal, delinquency, and child protection cases under certain
circumstances); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1205 (West Supp. 2000) (admissible in
criminal cases under certain circumstances); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 27-
775 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (admissible in juvenile and criminal proceedings under certain
circumstances); MASS. GEN. LAWs ch. 233, § 82 (Supp. 2000) (admissible in civil
proceedings under certain circumstances); id. § 81 (admissible in criminal proceedings
under certain circumstances); MICH. R. EVID. 803A (admissible in criminal and
delinquency proceedings under certain circumstances); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02(3)
(West 2000) (admissible under certain circumstances); MISS. R. EVID. 803(25) (admissible
under certain circumstances); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 491.075 (West 1996) (admissible in
criminal proceedings under certain circumstances); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51.385
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statements to psychologists, however, are commonly attacked on the
ground that children are very suggestible and thus might falsely
report sexual abuse.8 Thus, when determining whether to admit after-
abuse testimony by psychologists, courts must consider whether a
child's admittance of sexual abuse is inherently untrustworthy.9
Since the early 1980s, courts have been increasingly willing to
admit out-of-court statements under the medical treatment or
diagnosis"° exception to the hearsay rule." In North Carolina,
(Michie 1996) (admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances); N.J. R.
EVID. 803(27) (admissible in criminal, juvenile, and civil proceedings under certain
circumstances); N.Y. FAM. Cr. ACr § 1046(a) (McKinney Supp. 2001) (admissible in child
protection proceedings under certain circumstances); OHIO R. EVID. 807 (admissible
under certain circumstances); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2803.1 (West 1993 & Supp.
2001) (admissible in criminal and juvenile proceedings under certain circumstances); OR.
REV. STAT. § 40.460(18a) (1997) (admissible under certain circumstances); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit 42, § 5985.1 (West 2000) (admissible in criminal proceedings under certain
circumstances); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 19-16-38 (Michie 1995) (admissible in criminal
and juvenile proceedings under certain circumstances); TEX. GRIM. P. CODE ANN.
§ 38.072 (Vernon Supp. 2001) (admissible in criminal proceedings under certain
circumstances); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.031 (Vernon 1996) (admissible in
delinquency proceedings under certain circumstances); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 104.006
(Vernon Supp. 2001) (admissible in proceedings affecting the parent-child relationship
under certain circumstances); TEX. Gov. CODE ANN. §§ 2001.121-.122 (Vernon 2000)
(admissible under certain circumstances); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-411 (1999)
(admissible in criminal proceedings under certain circumstances); VT. R. EVID. 804a
(admissible in civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings under certain circumstances);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.44.120 (West 2000) (admissible in dependency,
delinquency, and criminal proceedings under certain circumstances); see also 2
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra, § 277 (stating that members of the child's family,
hospital attendants, and ambulance drivers qualify as auditors of the statement); 2 MYERS,
EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.39 (describing the type and nature of statements admissible
under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception). The reliability of hearsay testimony
admitted under the medical treatment or diagnosis exception assumes that the child has an
incentive to speak truthfully to the caregiver. Robert P. Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse
and Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REV. 257,
259 (1989). Whether child-victims understand the purpose of medical treatment when
speaking to mental health professionals such as psychologists, however, is questionable.
hI at 281; ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE IN CIVIL CASES: A GUIDE TO
CUSTODY AND TORT ACTIONS 308 (1999).
8. See HARALAMBIE, supra note 7, at 308.
9. State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 1224, 1228 (Idaho 1989) (stating that the tainting of
young children's memories from suggestive questioning is "irremediable"); State v.
Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1378 (N.J. 1994) (stating that suggestive questioning debilitates
young children's memories); HARALAMBIE, supra note 7, at 311 & n.61, n.62 (discussing
conflicting research about children's suggestibility). But see English v. State, 982 P.2d 139,
146-47 (Wyo. 1999) (refusing to require a pretrial "taint" hearing to consider the effects of
suggestive questioning, concluding that a child's testimonial capacity should be addressed
in a normal competency hearing).
10. FED. R. EVID. 803(4); Lovejoy v. United States, 92 F.3d 628, 632 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting hearsay statements
of child-victim's mother because of the mother's interest in promoting her daughter's
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statements admissible under this exception include: "[s]tatements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing
medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or
the inception or general character of the cause or external source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
12
The medical treatment or diagnosis exception to the hearsay rule is
premised on the critical assumption that a patient receiving medical
treatment has an incentive to speak truthfully to the caregiver,
thereby ensuring the reliability of the testimony. 3
When a child-victim of sexual abuse makes out-of-court
statements to a medical doctor or mental health professional, the
child-victim's lack of a selfish-treatment motive calls into question the
reliability of the statements. 4 Consequently, several states, including
North Carolina, have limited the scope of the medical treatment or
diagnosis hearsay exception by requiring an objective two-pronged
analysis.15 First, under the "purpose inquiry" prong, the court must
treatment); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988) ("An individual's
statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment have frequently been
admitted into evidence regardless of whether the individual was competent to testify at
trial."); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that a
factual foundation for a medical diagnosis is sufficiently reliable to satisfy the hearsay
prescription); 4 CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KILPATRICK, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 442 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 2000).
11. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." State v.
Hinnant, 351 N.C. 277, 283, 523 S.E.2d 663, 667 (2000) (quoting N.C. R. EID. 801(c)).
Hearsay may be admissible only if excepted by statute or the Rules of Evidence. Id. at
283, 523 S.E.2d at 667 (citing N.C. R. EVID. 802).
12. N.C. R. EvID. 803(4).
13. Mosteller, supra note 7, at 257. Notably, the medical treatment or diagnosis
hearsay exception "was designed with adults in mind." 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note
6, § 7.41. Legitimate concerns about the truthfulness and reliability of young children's
statements exist because some young children do not understand the purpose of medical
and psychological procedures. Young children in particular may fail to understand that
the session with a psychologist is for treatment purposes because the session is likely to
occur in a "play room." Id. § 7.39. Yet some young children do understand the need to be
truthful and accurate when speaking to mental health professionals such as psychologists.
Because some child-victims of sexual abuse do not understand the relationship between
their abuse and the need for treatment, one must question whether the treating doctor or
mental health professional sought information that was "reasonably pertinent" to
treatment. Id. § 7.41.
14. 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.41. By the time young children reach the
age of five or six, most of them understand the purpose of medical treatment. Id. Because
not every five- or six-year-old has the same mental capacity, each child's comprehension of
the purpose of medical treatment should be assessed on a case-by-case basis. Id
15. See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980); R.S. v.
Knighton, 592 A.2d 1157, 1161 (N.J. 1991); State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn.
1993).
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analyze the declarant's intent. 6 Second, under the "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment" prong, the court must evaluate
the reasonableness of the doctor's reliance on the statement.17  This
two-pronged analysis is intended to ensure that the admitted hearsay
statements are trustworthy and reliable."
Recently, in State v. Hinnant,19 the North Carolina Supreme
Court clarified its interpretation of the exception when it adopted an
"objective circumstances" test to assess the declarant's intent
regarding the medical diagnosis or treatment.20  According to the
Hinnant court, the medical exception under Rule 803(4) should not
apply in cases of child sexual abuse where the statements were made
without any view toward obtaining treatment.2 Despite providing
some objective guidelines to assess the declarant's intent, 22 the
Hinnant court did not address the significance of the caretaker's role
in initiating treatment, nor did the court leave any room for the
admission of psychological hearsay testimony. The court's limitation
on the admissibility of hearsay statements,23 especially with regard to
16. E.g., Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284,523 S.E.2d at 668.
17. Id. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 670.
18. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d at 83-84 (stating that the patient's selfish-treatment motive
ensures trustworthiness); Knighton, 592 A.2d at 1160 (stating that a declarant is motivated
to accurately describe the events when she knows that she has been injured); Barone, 852
S.W.2d at 220 (holding that statements are reliable and trustworthy if made with a motive
to improve health).
19. 351 N.C. 277,523 S.E.2d 663 (2000).
20. Id. at 288,523 S.E.2d at 670.
21. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 285-86, 523 S.E.2d at 668 (citing State v. Stafford, 317 N.C.
568, 574, 346 S.E.2d 463, 467 (1986)). In support of this limitation, critics of the expansive
view of the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception allege that courts have
engaged in result-oriented jurisprudence to solve the larger social problem of child abuse.
Mosteller, supra note 7, at 258; Robert R. Rugani, Jr., Comment, The Gradual Decline of a
Hearsay Exception: The Misapplication of Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4), the Medical
Diagnosis Hearsay Exception, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 867, 904 (1999) (arguing that
"society's anger" about child sexual abuse fueled the misapplication of Rule 803(4)).
Contra Benita A. Lloyd, Note, State v. Smith, 9 CAMPBELL L. REv. 437, 470-71 (1987)
(arguing that a broad admission of hearsay statements pursuant to N.C. R. EVID. 803(4) is
laudable when the likelihood of convicting child sexual abusers is increased); Marilyn J.
Maag, Note, Goldade v. State, 674 P.2d 721 (Wyo. 1983), 53 U. GIN. L. REV. 1155, 1166
(1984) (discussing the strong public policy in favor of admitting hearsay testimony to
convict child abusers).
22. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 669-70 (noting that courts should consider
the setting of the interview, the nature of questioning, and the person to whom the
declarant was speaking when determining whether the declarant was speaking for the
purpose of receiving treatment). Although the Hinnant court held that all objective
circumstances surrounding the declarant's statement should be assessed when determining
the requisite intent, the use of corroborating physical evidence was rejected. Id. at 288,
523 S.E.2d at 670 (citing Idaho v. Wright, 447 U.S. 805, 822 (1990)).
23. See infra notes 36-49 and accompanying text.
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mental health professionals, makes prosecution of the alleged
perpetrator more difficult because it excludes from evidence
statements made by the most compelling witness-the child-victim.
Before Hinnant, whether the child-victim needed to possess the
actual intent to receive treatment was unclear.2 4 Although the court
recognized that statements admitted under the exception were
inherently trustworthy and reliable due to the patient's self-interest in
responding truthfully to a doctor or caretaker for purposes of medical
treatment,2 the court did not "squarely address[]" whether the
"purpose" prong under the rule was limited to the declarant's intent.26
Instead, prior to Hinnant, the court focused mainly on whether the
physician or psychologist's intent was to treat or diagnose the child-
victim and whether the hearsay statements were "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis."'27 In other words, if the physician or
psychologist possessed the intent to treat the child, whether the child
24. State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 85,337 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1985); 2 KENNETH S. BROUN,
BRANDIS & BROUN's NORTH CAROLINA EVIDENCE § 217 (5th ed. 1998 & Supp. 1999).
In 1983, North Carolina adopted the federal version of the medical treatment or diagnosis
exception to the hearsay rule. An Act to Simplify and Codify the Rules of Evidence, ch.
701, sec. 1, 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 666, 676-77 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, Rule
803(4) (1999)). North Carolina is one of twenty-five states that have adopted Federal
Rule 803(4) verbatim or with some minor variation. See, e.g., ARIZ. R. EVID 803(4); ARK.
R. EvID 803(4); COLO. R. EVID 803(4); HAw. R. EVID. 803(b)(4); IOWA R. EVID. 803(4);
ME. R. EVID. 803(4); MINN. R. EVID. 803(4); MISS. R. EVID 803(4); N.D. R. EVID. 803(4);
OHIO R. EVID 803(4); TEX. R. EVID. 803(4); UTAH R. EviD. 803(4); WASH. R. EVID.
803(4); W. VA. R. EVID. 803(4).
25. State v. Bullock, 320 N.C. 780, 782-83, 360 S.E.2d 689, 690 (1987) (affirming the
trial court's admission of two child-victims' statements to psychologists because "[i]n the
context of child sexual abuse or child rape, a victim's statements to a physician as to the
assailant's identity are pertinent to diagnosis and treatment"); State v. Aguallo, 318 N.C.
590, 595-96, 350 S.E.2d 76, 79-80 (1986) (concluding that the child had a selfish-treatment
motive when a social worker brought the child to a medical examiner, and the medical
treatment was not for trial purposes); Smith, 315 N.C. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 839 (1985)
(stating that the child's statements to her grandmother about the alleged sexual abuse,
coupled with the child's mother taking her to the hospital, satisfied the "purpose inquiry"
prong).
26. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 284,523 S.E.2d at 668.
27. Aguallo, 318 N.C. at 596-97, 350 S.E.2d at 80 (citing the nature of the problem,
the type of exam performed, and the identity of the perpetrator as evidence that the
child's statements were pertinent to treatment); Smith, 315 N.C. at 85-86, 337 S.E.2d at
840 (holding that statements made to task force volunteers after medical treatment by a
licensed doctor were inadmissible even though the child may have thought the volunteers
were medical personnel); In re Lucas, 94 N.C. App. 442, 447-48, 380 S.E.2d 563, 566
(1989) (suggesting that even if statements lack trustworthiness, the statements will be
deemed trustworthy if relevant to diagnosis or treatment); State v. Oliver, 85 N.C. App. 1,
16, 354 S.E.2d 527, 536 (1987) (stressing that the temporal proximity between the abuse
and the psychological examination, and the fact that the trial occurred seven months after
the exam, supported admissibility of the hearsay testimony).
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actually intended to obtain treatment was not particularly relevant.
State v. Smith' is indicative of much of the case law from the
1980s and early 1990s in which courts did not inquire into the child-
victim's motive, but instead analyzed whether the child-victim had in
fact received medical treatment.2 9  Although the Smith court
acknowledged that a patient must have a self-interested motive in
seeking treatment, the court admitted that young children do not
(and often cannot) independently seek medical treatment.
30  When
children rely on their caretakers to seek medical treatment on their
behalf, the child's self-interested motive in seeking treatment is
satisfied.31 For this reason, the court admitted statements made by
two child-victims to their grandmother about the alleged abuse.
3 2
Because the statements directly resulted in medical attention, the
statements to the grandmother were similar to statements made
directly to a medical doctor by a person seeking treatment on their
behalf.
33
The Smith court, however, held that the child's statements to two
Rape Task Force volunteers assigned to treat "the emotional effects
of the incidence" were inadmissible.' The court focused on several
factors in ruling against admissibility of the statements: (1) the
volunteers were not licensed professionals, (2) the statements were
made after the child had received medical treatment, and (3) the
possibility that the child may not have understood the treatment
motive of the volunteers.35 The Smith court was unclear as to which
28. 315 N.C. 76,337 S.E.2d 833 (1985).
29. See, e.g., United States v. Joe, 8 F.3d 1488, 1494 n.5, 1495 (10th Cir. 1993)
(admitting a statement based solely on the physician's reasonable reliance); Gong v.
Hirsch, 913 F.2d 1269, 1274 n.4 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that reliable facts used to diagnose
the patient are sufficiently reliable for hearsay admission); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d
801, 809 (Ariz. 1987) (en banc) (stating that statements must be reasonably pertinent to
treatment because young children may not understand the significance of medical
treatment).
30. See Smith, 315 N.C. at 84-85,337 S.E.2d at 840.
31. See id. at 84, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
32. See id.
33. The court's analysis failed to distinguish which "prong" of the medical treatment
or diagnosis hearsay exception it was applying, or whether it was following a specific test.
Mosteller, supra note 7, at 271. The court did not differentiate between the patient's "self-
interest motive" and the statements' "reasonable pertinence" to treatment when
determining whether the out-of-court statement was trustworthy. Id Instead of
evaluating the child's motive for seeking medical treatment, the court focused on the fact
that the children were actually treated by a medical physician in admitting the hearsay
testimony. See Smith, 315 N.C. at 84,337 S.E.2d at 840.
34. Smith, 315 N.C. at 86, 337 S.E.2d at 840.
35. Id.; see also Mosteller, supra note 7, at 271-72 (suggesting that one interpretation
of Smith is that the auditor must have formal, specialized training, and another
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of these three factors guided its exclusion of the hearsay testimony.
In light of the court's emphasis on immediate medical treatment in
Hinnant, the viability of the Smith court's analysis of the Rape Task
Force volunteers' testimony is questionable.
In State v. Hinnant,36 the North Carolina Supreme Court clarified
its interpretation of the "purpose" prong of Rule 803(4) by focusing
solely on the declarant's intent and by admitting after-the-fact
statements made to mental-health professionals and psychologists.
On December 16, 1995, a four-year-old girl was allegedly sexually
assaulted by a man who lived in her mother's home.37 Approximately
five to ten minutes after the alleged abuse, the child's mother called
the police. That evening, an external genital examination revealed
no signs of genital trauma. 9 Two weeks later, before a follow-up
physical examination, a clinical psychologist specializing in child
sexual abuse interviewed the child.40 The psychologist testified that
she used an anatomically correct doll and asked leading questions
during her interview with the child.41 The follow-up examination was
inconclusive as to sexual abuse but was consistent with the child's
statements to the psychologist.42 Because the child was unable to
testify at trial due to her heightened emotional state, the court
allowed the testimony of the psychologist in which she admitted using
an anatomical doll and asking leading questions.43 The North
interpretation is that the treatment must be medical, as opposed to emotional or
psychological).
36. 351 N.C. 277,523 S.E.2d 663 (2000).
37. Id. at 280, 523 S.E.2d at 665.
38. Id. Notably, the child's mother refused to cooperate with the police when she
arrived at the police station, stating that the child was prone to fabrication. Id. at 280-81,
523 S.E.2d at 665.
39. Id. at 281, 523 S.E.2d at 666. Soon after the alleged abuse, a detective interviewed
the child in a separate room where she told him that the defendant had hurt her on her
crotch and buttocks. Id. The child pointed to these areas on an anatomically correct doll
and showed the detective how the defendant had hurt her. Id The court's opinion does
not indicate whether the detective was asked to testify to these findings. Id.
40. Id.
41. See id. Most of the questions the psychologist asked only required the child to
answer "yes" or "no." See id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 280-82, 523 S.E.2d at 665-66. Authorities suggest that anatomically correct
dolls may be misused, and are not a "test" for sexual abuse. Barbara W. Boat & Mark D.
Everson, Concerning Practices of Interviewers When Using Anatomical Dolls in Child
Protective Services Investigations, 1 CHILD MALTREATMENT, 96, 96-97 (1996); Barbara
W. Boat & Mark D. Everson, Putting the Anatomical Doll Controversy in Perspective: An
Examination of the Major Uses and Criticisms of the Dolls in Child Sexual Abuse
Evaluations, 18 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 113, 118-26 (1994); Am. Prof'l Soc'y on the
Abuse of Children, Use of Anatomical Dolls in Child Sexual Abuse Assessments (1995)
1096 [Vol. 79
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Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court erred in admitting
the psychologist's testimony. 4
On appeal, the North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized that
two separate prongs of the exception must be satisfied to admit a
hearsay statement: (1) the declarant's statement must be "made for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and; (2) ... the
declarant's statements [must be] reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment. '4  The court clarified its interpretation of the first prong
by requiring a "selfish-treatment" motive on behalf of the declarant.46
The court warned that the "firmly rooted" status of the medical
treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception would be eroded if courts
continued either to assume that the declarant had a treatment motive
or not to require such a motive at all.47 Without a treatment motive
[hereinafter APSAC, Use of Anatomical Dolls], reprinted in 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS,
EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 1.38, at 120 (3d ed. 1997). Leading
questions can also be highly problematic due to the potential for false accusations and
falsified memories attributable to the inherent suggestibility of leading questions. DAVID
P.H. JONES, INTERVIEWING THE SEXUALLY ABUSED CHILD: INVESTIGATION OF
SUSPECTED ABUSE 37 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing the risks associated with the use of
leading questions and providing strategies to overcome those risks); Michael E. Lamb, The
Investigation of Child Sexual Abuse: An Interdisciplinary Consensus Statement, 18 CHILD
ABUSE & NEGLECT 1021, 24 (1994) (suggesting that open-ended questions produce the
most reliable accounts of sexual abuse from children).
44. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 291, 523 S.E.2d at 672.
45. Id. at 284, 523 S.E.2d at 667. The North Carolina Supreme Court has followed an
increasing number of jurisdictions that combine the "selfish-treatment" and "reasonable
pertinence" rationales for admitting hearsay under the medical treatment or diagnosis
exception. 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.40 (citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d
941, 949 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801,
809 (Ariz. 1987)). The analytical soundness of combining the rationales may be
questionable when satisfying one rationale would suffice. 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra
note 6, § 7.40 (stating that the Renville court did not justify combining the two rationales).
For example, if a child lacks a selfish-treatment motive but her statements are reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis, the hearsay statement would not be admitted because the first self-
interest rationale is not satisfied. Id. Despite the rule's plain conjunctive language, the
North Carolina Supreme Court did not conceive of the possibility that the rationales could
independently provide a sufficient measure of trustworthiness to justify admitting the
hearsay statement. Cf 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.40 (stating that statements
should be admissible under the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception based on
each rationale standing alone).
46. See Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 287, 523 S.E.2d at 669. The Hinnant court did not
indicate clearly whether the child's caretaker's participation in seeking medical treatment
constituted an objective circumstance. Id. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 670 (stating that courts
should consider "all objective circumstances" when determining the child's requisite
intent). But see State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 84-85, 337 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1985) (providing
that young children may rely on their caretakers to seek medical attention because young
children are incapable of expressing a selfish-treatment motive).
47. See Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 286, 523 S.E.2d at 669; Mosteller, supra note 7, at 290
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on behalf of the child, statements made to physicians or psychologists
would not be inherently trustworthy and reliable.48 Yet, if a young
child is simply incapable of comprehending a treatment motive and a
caretaker acts on behalf of the child, reasonably relying on the
statement for treatment or diagnosis, the source of the statement's
untrustworthiness is unclear.
49
(arguing that admitting hearsay statements solely under the second prong of Rule 803(4)
removes the statements from a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"); Rugani, supra note 21,
at 891-96 (arguing that the reliability of children's statements to medical personnel
decreases when the selfish-treatment rationale is not invoked, and that unpredictability in
judgments inevitably results because of the reliance on the doctor's skills).
48. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 286, 523 S.E.2d at 669. A number of other courts recognize
the importance of the patient's "selfish-interest" motive in seeking treatment. See Oleson
v. Class, 164 F.3d 1096, 1098 (8th Cir. 1999) (relying on the patient's "selfish motive" to
receive medical treatment as the guarantee of trustworthiness of the statement); United
States v. Norman T., 129 F.3d 1099, 1105 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The exception is based on the
longstanding assumption [sic] patients have an overriding interest in telling the truth when
seeking medical treatment."); Ring v. Erickson, 983 F.2d 818, 820 (8th Cir. 1993)
(explaining that the premise of the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception is
that the patient is unlikely to lie because treatment is in her self interest); United States v.
Renville, 779 F.2d 430, 436 (8th Cir. 1985) (assuming that a patient will accurately describe
his symptoms because treatment will stem from his statements); Iron Shell, 663 F.2d at 83-
84 (stating that the patient's motive in seeking treatment is a guarantee of
trustworthiness); R.S. v. Knighton, 592 A.2d 1157, 1160 (N.J. 1991) (stating that "the
declarant knows he or she is injured and therefore is motivated to describe accurately his
or her symptoms and their source"); In re Esperanza M., 955 P.2d 204, 207-08 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1998) (noting that the risk of ambiguity and misperception in memory is low when
the patient has a self-interest in describing her symptoms for treatment); In re Nicole B.,
703 A.2d 612, 616 (R.I. 1997) (observing a logical relationship between effective medical
treatment and accurate portrayal of the child-victim's symptoms); State v. Stinnett, 958
S.W.2d 329, 331 (Tenn. 1997) ("[A] statement made by a patient to a physician is
presumptively trustworthy because a patient is strongly motivated to speak the truth in
order to receive proper diagnosis and treatment."); State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216, 220
(Tenn. 1993) (noting that the patient's motivation to tell the truth about her symptoms is
stronger than her motivation to lie).
49. See State v. J.C.E., 767 P.2d 309, 313-14 (Mont. 1988) (doubting that the selfish-
treatment rationale can be applied to young children and rejecting the extension of the
medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception beyond medical doctors); State v.
Florczak, 882 P.2d 199, 205-06 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (admitting a child's hearsay
statements when the child lacked a motive for treatment, but when the injury was not
fabricated and corroborating evidence existed). Compare Pamela M. Kato et al.,
Reasoning About Moral Aspects of Illness and Treatment by Preschoolers Who Are
Healthy or Who Have Chronic Illness, 19 J. DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 68,
71-74 (1998) (reporting data suggesting that young children cannot easily distinguish
illness and treatment from punishment), with Melody R. Herbst et al., Young Children's
Understanding of the Physician's Role and the Medical Hearsay Exception, in CHILDREN'S
UNDERSTANDING OF BIOLOGY AND HEALTH 235, 245-46 (Michael Siegal & Candida C.
Peterson eds., 1999) (finding that five- and six-year-olds were able to describe doctors'
treatment function and special skills). Courts that have adopted an "objective
circumstances" test assume that a child is capable of having the same "selfish-treatment"
motive as an adult, and that children's memories are not inherently unreliable. See
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In Hinnant, as in Smith, the child's caretaker alerted the
authorities to the alleged abuse and took the initial steps toward
medical treatment. 5 The child's mother in Hinnant, however, later
recanted her belief that her child had suffered sexual abuse
5 The
Hinnant court fails to mention the caretaker's subsequent
contradiction of her earlier statements in its discussion of the purpose
inquiry. Thus, the court leaves unanswered whether a caretaker's
doubt that the alleged abuse occurred precludes a finding of a child's
selfish-treatment motive.
In addition to the court's requirement of a "selfish-treatment"
motive on behalf of the child-victim, the court focused heavily on
psychologist interviewing practices tending to produce unreliable and
untrustworthy results on behalf of the child-victim 3 Skepticism
about interview methods such as using anatomically correct dolls and
asking leading questions motivated, in part, the court's lack of
confidence in the reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay statements
made to psychologists. 4  Because fabricating descriptions of
psychological harms is easier than fabricating descriptions of physical
harms, in the court's view, the likelihood of objective verification
decreases.55  Some legal and psychological authorities indicate,
MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 118-19 (stating that developmental, personality,
and situational factors influence the suggestibility of young children); David Marxsen et
al., The Complexities of Eliciting and Assessing Children's Statements, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB.
POL'Y & L. 450, 450-51 (1995) (warning that the court's overemphasis on the
suggestibility of young children falsely portrays them as inherently unreliable and
untrustworthy).
50. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 280,523 S.E.2d at 665.
51. Id at 280-81, 523 S.E.2d at 665.
52. The court only considered the child's motive for treatment in the contest of the
psychological interview. Id. at 289-90, 523 S.E.2d at 671. The court never addressed the
child's intent with respect to her statements to her mother.
53. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 290,523 S.E.2d at 671; see also Mosteller, supra note 7, at 268
& n.36 (stating that psychological hearsay statements are not as reliable as statements
relating to somatic ailments).
54. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289-90, 523 S.E.2d at 671 (stating that the interview was
conducted in a "child friendly" room instead of a medical environment, and that the series
of leading questions could have planted the idea in the child's mind that she had been
sexually abused); Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666,682-83 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (stating
that the likelihood of trustworthiness in a statement concerning psychological injuries, as
opposed to physical injuries, was greatly diminished because the patient did not fear that
inaccurate information would lead to improper treatment when she suffered only
psychological injuries).
55. Mosteller, supra note 7, at 268; see People v. LaLone, 437 N.W.2d 611, 613 (Mich.
1989) (concluding that patients are more likely to provide deceptive information about
their symptoms to psychologists rather than medical physicians, and that empirical
verification of a patient's symptoms is more difficult in the context of psychological
symptoms).
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however, that "child friendly" interview rooms, leading questions,
and anatomically correct dolls can be very effective tools in
psychological treatment of sexually abused children when used in
moderation.5 6 According the American Professional Society on the
Abuse of Children (APSAC), these traditional psychological
interviewing tools are reliable and effective in eliciting truthful
information from child-victims for treatment purposes.' In Hinnant,
the record did not indicate that the psychologist misused the
anatomically correct doll, or that her leading questions were overly
suggestive. Thus, the court's holding that the child lacked the
requisite intent for psychological treatment or diagnosis may reflect a
questionable distrust of psychological interviewing tools. 58
56. Although there is agreement that anatomically correct dolls are not a litmus test
for the presence of sexual abuse, their use traditionally has been viewed by courts as a tool
in suggesting or stimulating children to remember and articulate their memories of the
alleged abuse. HARALAMBIE, supra note 7, at 23-24 (stating that anatomically correct
dolls are correctly used for body part identification and recreating the context of events,
but that no quantifiable test exists to determine if the child has been sexually abused); 1
MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 1.17 (stating that young children provide more
complete information when prompted by contextual factors aided by cues and leading
questions about reenactments of events) (citing Gerald P. Koocher et al., Psychological
Science and the Use of Anatomically Detailed Dolls in Child Sexual-Abuse Assessments,
118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 199,200 (1995)). Young children's memories are inextricably tied to
context and psychologists must use relevant physical and emotional cues to ensure that
children are not misled and to ensure that they will not falsify their reports. Margaret-
Ellen Pipe et al., Cues, Props, and Context: Do They Facilitate Children's Event Reports?
in CHILD VICTIMS, CHILD WITNESSES: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPROVING TESTIMONY
25, 26 (Gail S. Goodman & Bette L. Bottoms eds., 1993). But see supra note 43 (citing
studies that question the reliability of psychological interviewing practices involving
alleged victims of child sexual abuse).
57. The American Professional Society on the Abuse of Children (APSAC)
Guidelines indicate that most of the "available research does not support the position that
the dolls are inherently too suggestive and overly stimulating." APSAC, Use of
Anatomical Dolls, supra note 43, reprinted in 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES § 1.38, at 120 (3d ed. 1997); see also Sharon M. Katz et al.,
The Accuracy of Children's Reports with Anatomically Correct Dolls, 16 J.
DEVELOPMENTAL & BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 71, 71-76 (1995); Karen J. Saywitz et al.,
Children's Memories of a Physical Examination Involving Genital Touch: Implications for
Reports of Child Sexual Abuse, 59 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 682, 689-90
(1991). Authorities, however, caution against using anatomically correct dolls with
children under three-and-a-half years old. Gerald P. Koocher et al., Psychological Science
and the Use of Anatomically Detailed Dolls in Child Sexual-Abuse Assessments, 118
PSYCHOL. BULL. 199, 217 (1995); APSAC, Use of Anatomical Dolls, supra note 43,
reprinted in 1 JOHN E.B. MYERS, EVIDENCE IN CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT CASES
§ 1.38, at 123 (3d ed. 1997).
58. Supra notes 56-57 (discussing the use of anatomically correct dolls in helping
children articulate the details of alleged abuse). In addition, the court did not suggest any
alternatives to these psychological practices. Suggested guidelines would be helpful both
to psychologists administering treatment and to lower courts ascertaining whether the
psychologist's statements should be admitted under the exception. Such guidelines might
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Instead of acknowledging the utility of reputable psychological
interviewing tools, the court examined the "objective circumstances"
surrounding the declarant's statements to determine whether the
"purposes inquiry" prong had been satisfied.5 9 Relevant "objective
circumstances" included the setting of the interview, the nature of the
questioning, and the person to whom the statements were made.0
The problem with such an ambiguous "objective circumstances" test
is that it provides too much leeway for lower courts to exclude
hearsay statements made to psychologists because of unfounded
skepticism of psychological techniques.61 The court's "objective
circumstances" test focused solely on the actions of the interviewer,
and not on the developmental ability and motive of the child-
declarant. Research indicates, however, that an individual child's
suggestibility level differs according to the circumstances of the
interview. 62 Thus, the court's failure to consider each individual child-
declarant's ability to comprehend treatment 63 contradicts legal and
psychological authority suggesting that each individual child must be
assessed on a case-by-case basis to determine whether the child
include: (1) explicitly explaining to the child the medical purpose of the interview; (2)
requesting the child's truthfulness in explaining his answers; (3) limiting leading questions;
(4) using only anatomically correct dolls to clarify a child's statement; (5) limiting "child-
friendly" toys and fixtures in the interview room; (6) audio or videotaping the interview.
See HARALAMBIE, supra note 7, at 174-83.
59. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 670.
60. Id.
61. The Hinnant court may have sought to further limit the medical treatment or
diagnosis exception to highly skilled physicians. The court may have been cautious to
draw such a conclusion because courts have split over whether to include psychological
hearsay statements under the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception. See also
Mosteller, supra note 7, at 272 n.57 (discussing the possibility that the court in State v.
Smith wanted to limit the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception to highly
trained medical experts); Felix v. State, 849 P.2d 220, 249 (Nev. 1993) (citing a distrust of
psychological work in general as the source of the split among courts over whether to
admit psychological hearsay statements). For cases not admitting psychological testimony
under the medical treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception, see State v. Zimmerman, 829
P.2d 861, 864 (Idaho 1992); Cassidy v. State, 536 A.2d 666, 679-80 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988); State v. Harris, 808 P.2d 453, 457 (Mont. 1991); State v. J.C.E., 767 P.2d 309, 313
(Mont. 1988); State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216, 220 (Tenn. 1993); State v. Recor, 549 A.2d
1382, 1387 (Vt. 1988).
62. Mitchell L. Eisen et al., Memory and Suggestibility in Maltreated Children: New
Research Relevant to Evaluating Allegations of Sexual Abuse, in TRUTH IN MEMORY 163,
182 (Steven Jay Lynn & Kevin M. McConkey eds., 1998).
63. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 288, 523 S.E.2d at 670. The court noted the difficulty in
applying the test to young children, but ultimately concluded that "the trial court should
consider all objective circumstances of record surrounding declarant's statements in
determining whether he or she possessed the requisite intent .... ." Id. at 288, 523 S.E.2d
at 670.
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possessed a "selfish-treatment" motive.64
In future cases, courts should consider factors emphasizing the
individual declarant's developmental ability and motive, in addition
to the psychological interviewing tools, to produce a more reliable
assessment of the declarant's intent.65 The ten-factor test adopted by
the Michigan Supreme Court in People v. Meeboer6 is one example
of a more encompassing "objective circumstances" framework.67
64. Infra note 67. Although the court could assume the capability of treatment
motive for each child-victim of sexual abuse before considering the objective
circumstances, jurors could rely too heavily upon such a presumption. The presumption
also contradicts psychological authority indicating that not all children are capable of
possessing a "selfish-treatment" motive. See supra note 13 (discussing the reliability of
young children's statements to medical or psychological caregivers in light the inherent
inability of some young children to understand the purpose of medical treatment).
65. See, e.g., United States v. Barrett, 8 F.3d 1296, 1300 (8th Cir. 1993) (stating that
"the trial court must examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of
the statement and those rendering the declarant particularly worthy of belief"). But see
United States v. George, 960 F.2d 97, 100 (9th Cir. 1992) ("As a general matter, the age of
the child and her other personal characteristics go to the weight of the hearsay statements
rather than their admissibility."). The Supreme Court has rejected "mechanical tests" for
determining the reliability and trustworthiness of statements under the medical treatment
and diagnosis hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). A lack of a
motive to fabricate is one of the objective factors the Court identified to assess the
reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay statements made by child-victims of sexual
abuse. Id. at 821-22 (discussing the relevance of objective factors such as "spontaneity
and consistent repetition," "mental state of the declarant," "use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age," and "lack of motive to fabricate" in assessing the
reliability and trustworthiness of hearsay statements made by child-victims of sexual
abuse).
66. 484 N.W.2d 621,627 (Mich. 1992).
67. Id. at 627. The Michigan court recognized that the age of the declarant cannot
serve as a litmus test for a seffish-interest motive. Id.; see, e.g., State v. Logan, 806 P.2d
137, 139 (Or. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that as a matter of law, a four-year-old is not too
young to understand the concept of medical treatment); Gail S. Goodman & Beth M.
Schwartz-Kenney, Why Knowing a Child's Age is Not Enough: Influences of Cognitive,
Social, and Emotional Factors on Children's Testimony, in CHILDREN AS WITNESSES 15,
at 30-31 (Helen Dent & Rhonda Flin eds., 1992) (stating that simply knowing a child's age
is not enough); Daniel J. Burbach & Lizette Peterson, Children's Concepts of Physical
Illness: A Review and Critique of the Cognitive-Developmental Literature, 5 HEALTH
PSYCHOL. 307, 308 (1986) (stating that "age simply is not an accurate predictor of
cognitive maturity"). The ten objective factors are non-exhaustive and must be analyzed
on a case-by-case basis. State v. Stinnett, 958 S.W.2d 329, 331-32 (Tenn. 1997) (analyzing
the totality of the circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement-especially those
affecting the age and developmental ability of the declarant); State v. Moen, 786 P.2d 111,
119 (1990) (stating that the circumstances in which the statement was made must be
analyzed to judge the declarant's motive); Stephen J. Ceci & Mary Lyn Crotteau Huffman,
How Suggestible Are Preschool Children? Cognitive and Social Factors, 36 J. AM. ACAD.
CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 948, 957 (1997) (stating that "[t]he suggestibility of
any particular child is dependent on a host of cognitive and social factors"); Michelle D.
Leichtman & Stephen J. Ceci, The Effects of Stereotypes and Suggestions on Preschoolers'
Reports, 31 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 568, 576 (1995) (finding that children are
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Objective factors relevant to evaluating the trustworthiness of the
declarant's statement include: (1) the age and maturity of the
declarant, (2) the manner of eliciting statements, (3) the manner in
which statements were phrased, (4) the use of terminology
unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) person who initiated
examination, (6) the timing of examination in relation to the assault,
(7) the timing of examination in relation to the trial, (8) the type of
examination, (9) the relationship between the declarant and the
person identified as the perpetrator, and (10) the lack of a motive to
lie.68
Although an analysis of these ten factors may have resulted in
the same conclusion in Hinnant, a more specific multi-factored
approach would provide a more cohesive framework for lower courts
to evaluate the reliability of out-of-court statements made to mental
health professionals by child-victims of sexual abuse. Because the
factors are non-exclusive and because lower courts in North Carolina
would maintain the discretion to weigh certain factors more than
others, the multi-factored approach will not unduly constrain trial
courts.69 Moreover, the ten-factor test would enable the child's
caretaker to play a significant role in determining the child's "selfish-
interest" motive. For example, if the child's caretaker initiated
treatment immediately after the alleged sexual abuse, this fact would
be one objective circumstance used to determine whether the child's
statements to a psychologist were truthful.
The importance of this initial determination of whether the child
possessed the requisite intent is underscored by the importance the
Hinnant court placed on the child-declarant's "motivation to be
truthful" in determining the "reasonable pertinence" of hearsay
statements made to physicians and psychologists.70 Although the
court emphasized the relationship between truthfulness and the
immediacy of medical treatment, it failed to define "immediate
medical attention." Furthermore, whether the relationship between
the two even applies to mental health professionals such as
"heavily reliant" on the context of the environment in which the interview takes place).
68. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 627. For example, leading questions may threaten the
trustworthiness of statements whereas child-like terminology may indicate
trustworthiness.
69. Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected "mechanical tests" for determining the
reliability and trustworthiness of statements under the medical treatment and diagnosis
hearsay exception. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 822 (1990). The Supreme Court noted
that courts must have "considerable leeway" in determining the significance of the
objective circumstances. Id.
70. IM.
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psychologists is unclear.71 While the court rejected the admissibility
of the child's statements to the clinical psychologist in Hinnant, the
court was silent about the time period in which statements made to a
"nontreating clinical psychologist" will be admissible. If the child-
victim must need of "immediate medical attention" for the
"reasonable pertinence" standard to be satisfied, it is difficult to
imagine how the testimony of a "nontreating clinical psychologist"
would ever be admissible. By explicitly limiting the context in which
child victims' out-of-court statements are admissible, the auditors of
these statements are implicitly limited as well. Practically, only
paramedics, medical physicians, nurses, and family members would
be the recipients of a child-victim's statements in a state of
"immediate medical attention" under the Hinnant rule. Without
explicitly excluding psychologists from the medical treatment or
diagnosis hearsay exception, the court implicitly discounted them by
requiring a child victims' out-of-court statements to be made when
the child needs "immediate medical attention."
The court also failed to distinguish between statements made for
purposes of treatment and statements made for purposes of diagnosis
in evaluating the reasonable pertinence of the challenged
statements.' The hearsay exception, however, differentiates between
diagnosis and treatment.73 The Advisory Committee's notes to Rule
803(4) indicate that the exception is usually only applicable when a
"treating physician or psychiatrist" 74 is the auditor of statements
"relevant to diagnosis or treatment."'75 The court's rationale for
limiting the exception to "treating" doctors is that "non-treating"
examinations are usually investigation-related procedures conducted
for trial purposes, or remote in time to the alleged abuse.76 An
examination conducted in close proximity to litigation diminishes the
reliability of the hearsay statements because the child-victim does not
71. Id.
72. Id. at 290-92, 523 S.E.2d at 671-72. The court collapsed "diagnosis" into
"treatment" for purposes of analyzing the "reasonable pertinence" prong.
73. See supra text accompanying note 12 (quoting N.C. R. EVID. 803(4)).
74. N.C. R. EVID. 803(4) advisory committee's note (emphasis added).
75. Id.
76. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 670. Non-treating physicians or
psychologists who examine child-victims when immediate relief is no longer a concern are
viewed similarly to investigators at trial even when the purpose of their evaluation is to
determine if the child-victim needs treatment. Sharp v. Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542,
543 (Ky. 1993) (stating that a psychiatrist's evaluation of an alleged child-victim of sexual
abuse "to determine whether there was a reason for treatment" was inadmissible because
the examination occurred too far after the need for treatment had arisen).
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have the requisite intent to be treated.77 Yet one of the major
changes in the federal counterpart to North Carolina's medical
treatment or diagnosis hearsay exception was to make statements
made to non-treating doctors admissible. 78  The purpose of Rule
803(4) was to eliminate any distinction in the analysis of an
examination for the purpose of treatment and an examination for the
purpose of diagnosis only.79 Thus, Rule 803(4) was amended to
acknowledge that the truthfulness of statements made for the purpose
of diagnosis-not necessarily relating to treatment-also could be
guaranteed if they formed the basis of the medical doctor's or mental
health professional's opinion."
Hinnant represents North Carolina's rejection of the federal
rule's abolition of the distinction between "treating" and "non-
treating" examinations of child sexual abuse victims.81 Although the
child-victim's incentive to be truthful dissipates when interviewed
solely for purposes of trial preparation, it is less clear why a child-
victim's statements to her psychologist would be less reliable when
the psychologist is attempting to diagnose the child-victim. A
medical professional clearly can diagnose an alleged child-victim of
sexual abuse without being specifically retained for trial. The court,
however, did not contemplate a separate analysis of "non-treating"
doctors under the subdivisions "diagnosis-only" and "trial
preparation-only." Instead, the court lumped all "non-treating"
medical professionals into the "trial preparation-only" category,
thereby eliminating the selfish-treatment motive on behalf of the
77. See Mosteller, supra note 7, at 275 (arguing that the reliability of statements made
to non-treating or diagnosis-only physicians is based on the expert's special skills and not
on the child-declarant's selfish-interest in receiving treatment).
78. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 803(4)[01], at 803-154
(1995) ("Rule 803(4) rejects the distinction between treating and nontreating physicians
.... "); Mosteller, supra note 7, at 261.
79. United States v. Farley, 992 F.2d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing United States
v. Iron Shell, 63 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980)); Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 950 (4th Cir.
1988) (quoting United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 83 (8th Cir. 1980)).
80. Mosteller, supra note 7, at 261. In this context, "non-treating" examinations
include both diagnostic examinations and examinations for trial purposes. The Hinnant
court categorically rejected non-treating exams for trial purposes, but did not address the
issue of non-treating exams for diagnostic purposes. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 285, 523 S.E.2d
at 668.
81. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 289, 523 S.E.2d at 670-71. The court never defined a non-
treating doctor as a medical professional retained for trial purposes, but the court
categorically rejected hearsay admissions from medical professionals who examined the
child-victim in preparation for trial. Id. at 670.
82. See O'Gee v. Dobbs Houses, Inc., 570 F.2d 1084, 1089 (N.Y. 1978) ("Rule 803(4)
clearly permits the admission into evidence of what [plaintiff] told [her doctor] about her
condition, so long as it was relied on by [the doctor] in formulating his opinion .... ).
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child-declarant and the inherent reliability of the hearsay statement.
s3
Examinations of child-victims for purposes of diagnosis and trial
preparation must be analyzed separately to acknowledge the
distinction between "treatment" and "diagnosis" in the hearsay
exception.
Indeed, the Hinnant court's analysis of the reasonable pertinence
prong attributed little significance to the possibility that the child
made the statements to the psychologist in the course of diagnosis.
s4
If the court meant that the "diagnosis" language lacks independent
significance, then information received in diagnosis, such as the
identity of the alleged perpetrator, would be inadmissible.85 The
inadmissibility of the perpetrator's identity contravenes the rationale
behind admitting such hearsay statements: the child's safety may be
jeopardized if she remains in close contact with the alleged
perpetrator.8 6  After Hinnant, whether a child-victim's statements
about his alleged perpetrator are "reasonably pertinent" when
discovered through diagnosis is open to challenge."
83. Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 290, 523 S.E.2d at 671 ("Rule 803(4) was not 'created to
except from the operation of the hearsay rule' statements made to a nontreating clinical
psychologist two weeks after the alleged victim received initial medical diagnosis.")
(quoting State v. Smith, 315 N.C. 76, 86, 337 S.E.2d 833, 840 (1985)); Sharp v.
Commonwealth, 849 S.W.2d 542, 544 (Ky. 1993) ("[S]tatements made to a physician who
lacks treatment responsibility have less inherent reliability than traditional patient
history.").
84. See Hinnant, 351 N.C. at 290-92, 523 S.E.2d at 671-72. According to the record,
the psychologist's purpose in examining the child was to provide information to a medical
doctor prior to a follow-up examination. The follow-up medical examination revealed
possible findings of sexual abuse, consistent with the child's statements to the psychologist.
Id. at 281, 523 S.E.2d at 666.
85. Although statements of fault are not included in the medical treatment exception,
statements identifying the alleged perpetrator are traditionally admissible because of their
"reasonable pertinence" to diagnosis or treatment. United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d
430, 438 (8th Cir. 1985); Mosteller, supra note 7, at 276. In Hinnant, the psychologist's
testimony was the only evidence the prosecution offered to convict the defendant of first-
degree rape. The sheer lack of other evidence of rape may have strongly influenced the
court's conclusion that the trial court erred in admitting the testimony. Hinnant, 351 N.C.
at 291,523 S.E.2d at 672.
86. The abuser's identity is often pivotal to psychological treatment of the child-
victim. 2 MYERS, EVIDENCE, supra note 6, § 7.39.
87. The court's first opinion since Hinnant indicates that the court's "objective
circumstances" purpose inquiry has significantly impacted the way lower courts view
psychologists' interviewing practices. State v. Waddell, 351 N.C. 413, 417-18, 527 S.E.2d
644, 647-48 (2000) (citing the non-medical environment, leading questions, "child
friendly" toys, the timing of the interview after the medical examination, and the failure of
the psychologist to explain the treatment purpose to the child-victim as factors
contributing to the lack of reliability and trustworthiness of the child-victim's hearsay
statements). Notably, Hinnant did not offer any standards for determining when a child-
victims' statements to mental health professionals are "pertinent to medical diagnosis."
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To comply with the Hinnant court's limitation of the rule,
specific guidelines for mental health professionals such as
psychologists are necessary. These guidelines for psychologists
interviewing potential child-victims of sexual abuse should suggest
that psychologists (1) determine whether the child understands that
the purpose of the interview is to provide diagnosis or treatment, (2)
emphasize the importance of accurate and truthful responses, and (3)
document how and why the child's statements are "reasonably
pertinent to diagnosis or treatment."'
In addition, a specific objective circumstance test emphasizing
the context of the interview and the developmental and cognitive
ability of the child should be adopted to evaluate the child-victim's
"selfish-treatment" motive. 9 Because the hearsay statements of
medical and psychological professionals may be the only evidence of
sexual abuse when a child cannot to testify, the court should explain
the "reasonably pertinent" standard for medical diagnosis or
treatment 9° and acknowledge the distinction between diagnosis and
treatment. 91 The North Carolina Supreme Court must acknowledge
child-victims' unequivocal reliance on caretakers to seek medical or
psychological treatment for sexual abuse and the importance of
psychological hearsay testimony in prosecuting the perpetrators of
the abuse. Otherwise, the most important witness will go unheard.
ANDREA D. BLOHM
88. MYERS, LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 1, at 163.
89. Supra note 65 and accompanying text.
90. Supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
91. Supra notes 72-87 and accompanying text.
